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IMPORTANT TERMS FOR INCLUSION IN 
CONFIDENTIAL SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS FOR 
FINANCIAL SERVICES COMPANIES 
Bryan D. Boltont 
INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW 
In a fast-paced financial world, it is easy to understand how 
parties agree on a settlement figure, assume the final documents 
resolving the matter are worth only perfunctory consideration, and 
press on to the next matter. This attitude is all the more 
understandable in the context of the pressures on in-house counsel 
to keep costs down, and on outside counsel to keep billing for 
collectable time. These pressures, among others, create 
opportunities for error in the context of what many refer to as a 
"standard" release. 
This article questions the wisdom of approaching a rapidly 
changing financial services world armed with nothing more than a 
traditional standard release. Indeed, this is no trivial matter 
because the majority of disputes are resolved through settlement. I 
Moreover, a traditional standard release may be ill-suited to the 
types of forward-looking financial instruments, products, and 
services offered by financial services companies. 
If a standard release does not clearly and unequivocally 
terminate the parties' future rights and obligations, is it reasonable 
to expect courts to interpret that agreement as intending 
consequences not expressed in the writing? Is it reasonable to 
expect courts to forbid parol evidence concerning the intent of the 
claimant, when the financial services company must offer its own 
parol evidence to establish intent? The premise of this article is 
that careful counsel, inside or outside, should look beyond standard 
t Mr. Bolton is a founding partner of his firm and is the partner in charge of 
litigation. Funk & Bolton P.A., Twelfth Floor, 36 South Charles Street, 
Baltimore, Maryland 21201-3111. Telephone: 410.659.7754, Facsimile: 
410.659.7773, bbolton@fblaw.com. http://www.funkandbolton.comlbios/ 
bryanbolton.php (last visited Jan. 25, 2006). 
I. Erik K. Moler et aI., Punitive Damages in Financial Injury Jury Verdicts, 28 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 283, 285 (1999) (citing BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T 
OF JUSTICE, NCJ-154346, SPECIAL REPORT: CIVIL JUSTICE SURVEY OF STATE 
COURTS, 1992: CWIL JURY CASES AND VERDICTS IN LARGE COUNTIES (1995)); 
David M. Trubeck et a!., The Cost of Ordinary Litigation, 31 UCLA L. REV. 72, 
86-87 (1983) (almost ninety percent of lawsuits are settled or abandoned without 
filing a claim). 
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or traditional release provisions in order to ensure that financial 
services companies receive the benefit of their settlement bargain. 
An essential component of this process requires appreciation of 
the fundamental difference between a standard release employed in 
tort cases and a release needed by a financial services company 
offering financial products looking years, if not decades, into the 
future. Although cataloging the myriad of financial instruments 
and products available in the marketplace is beyond the scope of 
this article, suffice it to say that annuities, fixed and variable; 
whole life, universal life, and variable life insurance policies; and 
various retirement accounts, including IRAs, 401Ks, and pension 
plans, are but a few examples. In contrast to these forward-looking 
financial instruments and products, most tort actions only concern 
events occurring in the past, e.g., an automobile accident or an 
incident of alleged medical malpractice. This difference in 
perspective, prospective versus retrospective, may not appear 
significant, but the differences are real and meaningful. 
Second, a significant reason for the difference between 
prospective financial instruments and retrospective tort claims is 
based on differences in judicial application of the legal doctrine of 
res judicata. Although a dismissal with prejudice in an automobile 
tort claim may extinguish all claims, including potential claims by 
a party,2 it is not equally true that a dismissal with prejudice will 
resolve the future rights of an annuitant to receive or transfer future 
annuity benefits or both.3 Rather, the future relations, if any, 
between the annuitant and the financial services company most 
likely will be governed by contract, meaning the settlement 
agreement and release executed by the parties that led to the 
dismissal of the pending action.4 
Third, financial services companies cannot realistically expect 
courts to assume responsibility for protecting large, sophisticated 
financial services institutions if they fail or neglect to protect their 
own rights through the express terms of a settlement agreement. 
Moreover, if the financial services company is compelled to offer 
2. See Samuels v. N. Telecom, Inc., 942 F.2d 834, 836 (2d Cir. 1991) ("[A] 
dismissal with prejudice has the effect of a final adjUdication on the merits 
favorable to the defendant and bars future suits brought by plaintiff upon the 
same cause of action." (quoting Nemaizer v. Baker. 793 F.2d 58, 60 (2d Cir. 
1986»); Harrison v. Edison Bros. Apparel Stores, Inc., 924 F.2d 530, 534 (4th 
Cir. 1991) ("A voluntary dismissal with prejudice ... is a complete adjudication 
on the merits of the dismissed claim."); Schwarz v. Folloder. 767 F.2d 125, 130 
(5th Cir. 1985) ("[A] dismissal with prejudice gives the defendant the full relief 
to which he is legally entitled and is tantamount to a judgment on the merits."). 
3. See Patrowicz v. Transamerica HomeFirst, Inc., 359 F. Supp. 2d 140, 156 (D. 
Conn. 2005) (finding some claims left unresolved by dismissal of a prior action). 
4. See Calabi v. Gov't Employees Ins. Co., 353 Md. 649, 653, 728 A.2d 206, 208 
(1999) (treating settlement agreements no different than binding contracts). 
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parol evidence to support its position, then a court is likely to find 
the agreement ambiguous as written and construe it against the 
financial services company.s Moreover, if the financial services 
company is forced to offer parol evidence of its broad intent at the 
time of settlement, then the court is equally likely to accept a 
claimant's testimony of the opposite intent.6 This leaves courts 
free to reason that, if a large financial services company failed to 
fully and adequately address its future obligations in its settlement 
agreement, then how can it penalize the consumer by permitting a 
discharge of those prospective obligations.7 
Understanding this background is essential to permanently 
resolving prospective claims against financial services companies. 
Moreover, by recognizing the differences, it is easy to understand 
how a standard release that may be routinely and effectively 
employed to resolve tort claims is likely to be woefully insufficient 
to protect a financial services company in connection with the 
settlement of a forward-looking financial product. 
This article highlights important considerations and issues that a 
financial services company or a lawyer representing a financial 
services company should consider before executing a settlement 
agreement and release. Notably, as outlined in greater detail 
below, this author submits the better practice is to enter into a 
settlement agreement and release as a fully integrated document. 
Although this article docs not purport to dictate specific language 
for inclusion in a settlement agreement and release, which may 
vary from state to state based on historical considerations, it 
provides the reader with sample language and highlights points for 
consideration and inclusion in a settlement agreement and release 
involving a financial services company. 
1. Recite and Acknowledge Receipt of the Consideration in the 
Agreement 
Although mutual promises may be sufficient consideration for a 
rclease,8 the better practice is to include the amount paid in 
5. See Wolfgang v. Mid-Am. Motorsports, Inc., 111 F.3d 1515, 1524-25 (lOth CiT. 
1997) (applying general contract interpretation rules); Pekar v. Local Union No. 
181 of the Int'l Union of United Brewery, 311 F.2d 628, 636 (6th CiT. 1962) 
(stating that when an agreement is ambiguous, the court will interpret the 
language with the uniform past practice of the parties). 
6. See Van Koevering v. Mfrs. Life Ins. Co., 234 F. Supp. 786, 790-91 (W.D. Mich. 
1964) (under the parol evidence rule, the court admitted extrinsic evidence of the 
plaintiff's intent and ultimately ruled in favor of the plaintiff). 
7. Cf Owen M. Fiss, Comment, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1076 
(1984) (arguing that the bargaining process disparity between plaintiffs and 
financial services companies is "at odds with a conception of justice"). 
8. E.g., City Nat'l Bank of Fort Smith v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Rogers, 
732 SW.2d 489, 493 (Ark. Ct. App. 1987). 
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settlement and to acknowledge receipt of that consideration in the 
settlement agreement. By including the specific amount of 
consideration paid in the settlement agreement, the financial 
services company largely moots any question as to the adequacy of 
the consideration.9 
The argument against including the amount paid in settlement 
generally is expressed in terms of a desire to keep the price of 
peace outside the public domain. lO The counter-points, however, 
are that this information will become public anyway because (I) 
the agreement may not be confidential; (2) the financial services 
company may be required to disclose it in financial or regulatory 
filings; and (3) the claimant may disclose it in an action to set aside 
the agreement because the consideration was too low. Although 
this last point may be disquieting, the disclosure under such 
circumstances generally should not prove harmful to a financial 
services company.ll 
Additional reasons exist for including the amount of 
consideration paid in the settlement agreement. First, as the world 
moves increasingly toward electronic transactions, including wire 
transfers, locating the documentation necessary to verify settlement 
payments made years in the past will be difficult. If an agreement 
was reached ten years ago concerning termination of an annuity, 
and the allegation was made today that the consideration was never 
paid, then imagine the difficulty in locating a copy of the canceled 
check to prove the consideration was paid. 
Second, if the financial services company is obligated to offer 
evidence outside the four comers of the settlement agreement and 
release in support of its motion for summary disposition, then the 
other side is better positioned to argue that it likewise can offer 
extrinsic rebuttal evidence. 12 A financial services company wants 
to present a case for summary disposition, not suggest through its 
own evidence that discovery and an evidentiary hearing are 
necessary. 13 By including all relevant terms in the settlement 
agreement and release, including the consideration paid and an 
acknowledgement of receipt of good and valuable consideration, 
9. See George R. Hall, Inc. v. Superior Trucking Co., 532 F.Supp. 985,992 (D. Ga. 
1982) (explaining that "ordinarily courts will not examine the adequacy of 
consideration" as long as some consideration exists). 
10. John Gilbeaut, Secret Justice, 84 A.B.A. J. 50, 50, 53 (1998). 
It. See Cleere v. United Parcel Serv., 669 P.2d 785, 790 (Okla. Civ. App. 1983) 
(stating that disclosure ofthe amount of consideration paid is a rare occurrence). 
12. See Outland v. Heritage Custom Constr., 2002-0hio-6595, at m139-40 (Ohio Ct. 
App. 2002) (holding it was error to allow one side, but not the other, to introduce 
parol evidence). 
13. Cf Hensley v. Alcon Labs., Inc., 277 F.3d 535, 540-41 (4th Cir. 2002) (holding 
that in order to enforce a settlement agreement, the parties must prove that the 
settlement is a complete agreement and that the terms and conditions are clear). 
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the financial services company increases the chances that a simple 
motion has a substantial chance of disposing of the entire matter. 
2. The Preamble Should Be Part of the Agreement 
After reciting the names of the settling parties, it is common to 
see a brief synopsis of the facts and circumstances leading to the 
settlement. Many parties fail to realize, however, that the 
preamble may not be part ofthe agreement. 14 Although this is not 
a problem if the draftsperson appreciates this point, it can become 
a problem. If, for example, the denial of liability appears in the 
preamble, but not in the agreement, then is liability still in dispute 
after the agreement is signed? This could raise difficult questions 
about whether the settlement agreement might be relevant and 
discoverable in a future action based on the contention that the 
company admitted liability. IS A simple solution to this problem is 
to incorporate the preamble into the agreement. Drafters of these 
settlements should consider adding language stating that the 
preamble is an integral part of, and forms a basis for, the parties' 
agreement. This should avoid any future contention that the 
preamble was unimportant, not integral, and not part of the 
settlement agreement. 
3. The Needfor a Broad Release of Claims 
Standard release language often exculpates a party from any 
liability to the other up through and including the date of the 
agreement, and with regard to the claims stated, or that could have 
been stated, in a specific lawsuit. 16 The impact of this standard 
language on the cash value in a whole life insurance policy may be 
unclear at best, and the parties' rights and obligations may be 
equally unclear. In fact, if the release only purports to release 
rights through the date of the settlement, then it is debatable 
whether future accruing rights and obligations were intended to 
constitute a part of the agreement. 
The careful practitioner should consider crafting the release to 
cover not only past, but also future benefits, rights, and obligations 
that the parties intend to resolve through the release. If, for 
example, the intent is to have the releasing party release all right, 
14. See Fassler v. Okemo Mountain, Inc., 536 A.2d 930, 933 (Vt. 1987) (quoting 
Vinyard v. St. Louis County, 399 S.W.2d 99, 106 (Mo. 1966)); Trs. of 
Canandarqua Acad. v. McKechnie, 90 N.Y. 618,626 (1882). 
IS. See Doe v. Methacton Sch. Dis!., 164 FRD. 175, 176-77 (E.D. Pa. 1995) 
(finding that a confidential settlement agreement is not discoverable if it is not 
relevant). 
16. E.g., First Trust Corp. v. Edwards, 172 S.W.3d 230, 235 (Tex. 2005); Venus 
Drywall, Inc. v. Kullman Indus., No. 93-2616E, 1996 Mass. Super. LEXIS 596, 
at *7-8 (Mar. 22,1996), aird, 693 N.E.2d 1066 (Mass. App. Ct. 1998). 
352 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 35 
title, and interest in the cash value of a whole life insurance policy, 
then include specific language addressing this point in the release 
provIsIOn. Similarly, if the intent is that the claimant will 
relinquish all rights to future annuity, disability, and pension plan 
benefits, then include language specifically releasing those rights 
in the release. 
Although language extending the release to "heirs, successors, 
and assigns" may seem common, this language is absolutely 
essential for a financial services company. Indeed, this language 
may serve as a bar to claims asserted for the first time after the 
death of the claimant. 17 A financial services company should not 
count on the courts to broadly construe a settlement agreement that 
is not broadly written and that does not explicitly or by necessary 
implication clearly contemplate the release of the asserted claim. 18 
4. Advice of Counsel Provision Is Important 
Although the law encourages the settlement of disputes and 
generally presumes a release is valid,19 the key for a financial 
services company is making certain that resolved matters stay 
resolved. A provision essential to keeping matters resolved is one 
providing that the settlement agreement was executed with the 
benefit of, and on the advice of, independent counse1.20 
If a settlement agreement and release is challenged based on 
allegations that it was "obtained by fraud, deception, 
misrepresentation, duress, or undue influence,,,21 then the advice of 
counsel provision, coupled with the integration clause, may be 
important tools for the defense. Assuming a challenge is made 
based on fraud or other similar grounds, then the inclusion in the 
settlement agreement and release of a provision expressly reciting 
that the document was executed with the benefit of and on the 
advice of independent counsel will be important. 22 
Absent the most egregious circumstances, it is hard to imagine a 
lawyer alleging he or she was duped into settling on unfavorable 
17. See, e.g., Kelley v. Burnsed, 805 So. 2d 1101, 1104 (Fla. 2002) (holding that 
heirs and assigns were bound by contract after death of the original contracting 
party). 
18. See Bernstein v. Kapneck, 290 Md. 452, 459,430 A.2d 602, 606 (1981) (stating 
that words used to express the breadth of a contract should be given their 
ordinary meaning). 
19. Schmitt-Norton Ford, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 524 F. Supp. 1099, 1102 (D. Minn. 
1981). 
20. Jd. 
21. Bennett v. Coors Brewing Co., 189 F.3d 1221, 1231 (10th Cir. 1999); Skrbina v. 
Fleming Co., 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 481,489 (1996). 
22. Fonseca v. Columbia Gas Sys., Inc., 37 F. Supp. 2d 214, 229 (W.D.N.Y. 1998). 
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terms.23 At most, a lawyer claiming to be duped could 
ineffectively allege he or she was unaware of material facts at the 
time of settlement. Absent fraud, an essentially unilateral mistake 
of settling on unfavorable terms generally is not grounds for setting 
aside a settlement agreement. 24 
Assuming counsel alleged a lack of full knowledge of the 
material facts, it is hard to imagine a court holding that opposing 
counsel had some affirmative duty of disclosure to an adversary in 
litigation.25 Moreover, settlement discussions frequently involve 
what is referred to as "puffery,,,26 which is a far cry from fraud. 
Indeed, relatively few settlements are achieved without both 
sides engaging in some degree of puffery as to the quality of their 
evidence, witnesses, trial skills, prospects at trial, and rulings on 
dispositive motions and motions in limine.27 Puffery between 
counsel in the course of the settlement negotiations will rarely, if 
ever, rise to the level of actionable fraud.28 This is particularly true 
when the agreement makes clear that the parties each had separate 
and independent counsel and advice at the time they entered into 
the agreement. 
The provision regarding the advice of separate and independent 
counsel also may be important in determining whether the 
purported reliance was reasonable.29 The point could be argued 
that the attorneys were posturing, or puffing, to each other, both 
were experienced counsel, and both understood what they were 
doing. Since each side had independent counsel of their own 
23. See Creamer v. Helferstay, 294 Md. 107, 121, 125,448 A.2d 332, 333-35, 341 
(1982) (summarizing the circumstances that did not rise to the level of 
"intentional, culpable conduct" necessary to set aside a settlement agreement). 
24. ld. at 120-26,448 A.2d at 339-42. 
25. See Spiegel v. Cont'! III. Nat'l Bank, 609 F. Supp. 1083, 1088 n.ll (N.D. III. 
1985), ajf'd, 790 F.2d 638 (7th Cir. 1986) (finding no duty to disclose in context 
of adversariallitigation). 
26. E.g., Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Chiles Power Supply, Inc., 332 F.3d 976, 
981 (6th Cir. 2003); Williams v. Texaco Ref. & Mktg., Inc., No. 94-2087, 1995 
U.S. App. LEXIS 9830, at *2-3 (4th Cir. May 1, 1995); Promotion in Motion, 
Inc. v. Kenny's Candy Co., No. 97-3512, 1999 U.S. Dis!. LEXIS 22174, at *10 
(D.N.J. Nov. 29,1999). 
27. See, e.g., Addo v. Globe Life & Accident Ins. Co., 230 F.3d 759, 763-74 (5th Cir. 
2000) (Wiener, 1., dissenting) (describing the document as "a 'sham' of a 
settlement counteroffer," and as "puffery and posturing"); Gwyn v. Wal-Mart 
Stores, Inc., 955 F. Supp. 44, 46 (M.D.N.C. 1996) (stating that the natural 
tendency is for counsel to inflate a claim's value is puffery). 
28. See, e.g., Turf Lawnmower Repair v. Bergen Record Corp., 655 A.2d 417, 430 
(N.J. 1995) (considering puffery in consumer context). 
29. See Felix v. Lucent Teehs., Inc., 387 F.3d 1146, 1164-65 (lOth Cir. 2004) 
(quoting Silver v. Slusher, 770 P.2d 878, 881 n.8 (Okla. 1989» (reasonable 
reliance on misrepresentations is required to prove fraud). 
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choosing, the claim of "reasonable" reliance on opposing counsel 
is inherently unreasonable.3o 
5. Integration and Advice of Counsel- Better Together 
No settlement agreement is complete without an integration 
clause. Indeed, an integration clause, coupled with an advice of 
counsel clause, is a powerful combination against any attempt to 
set aside the settlement agreement based on fraud, duress, or undue 
influence.3 ! A typical integration clause might read as follows: 
Integration Clause. This Agreement constitutes 
the entire Agreement between the parties, and no 
representations, agreements, or understandings of 
any kind, either written or oral, shall be binding 
upon the parties unless expressly contained herein. 
This Agreement is a complete and exhaustive 
statement of the terms of the parties' agreement, 
which may not be explained or supplemented by 
evidence of consistent additional terms or 
contradicted by evidence of any pnor or 
contemporaneous agreement. No modification of 
this Agreement shall be effective unless it is III 
writing and signed by each of the parties?2 
In addition to helping defeat any misrepresentation claims, this 
provision should bar any party from (1) offering extrinsic evidence 
to interpret the terms of a fully integrated unambiguous agreement; 
(2) claiming the agreement was not what the parties intended; and 
(3) claiming the a¥:reement was modified, amended, or rescinded 
by oral agreement.· 3 
Another important aspect of the integration clause pertains to 
what is generally referred to as the parol evidence rule.34 The 
parol evidence rule generally bars oral testimony about antecedent 
or contemporaneous conversations, negotiations, agreements, or 
30. See Finn v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 821 F.2d 581, 586 (11th Cir. 1987) 
(finding that because of the adversarial relationship, the parties had no right to 
rely on any of the opposing parties representations). 
31. See Vigortone AG Prods., Inc. v. AG Prods., Inc., 316 F.3d 641, 644 (7th Cir. 
2002) (explaining that with the parol evidence rule, an integration clause prevents 
a party from relying on agreements made during negotiations which were not 
contained in the actual contract); Bennett v. Coors Brewing Co., 189 F.3d 1221, 
1231 (10th Cir. 1999) (finding that, notwithstanding threats, a transaction 
generally is not induced by duress where a party was advised by counsel). 
32. Nigrelli v. Catholic Bishop, No. 94-2528, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 28271, at *2 
(7th CiT. Oct. II, 1995). 
33. See also id. (holding that a party cannot avoid or disregard a mutual contract 
because it is less profitable than anticipated). 
34. Vigorrone, 316 F.3d at 644 (citing Bidlack v. Wheelabrator Corp., 993 F.2d 603, 
608 (7th Cir. 1993». 
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understandings between the contracting parties, if offered to vary 
or contradict the tenns of a fully integrated contract.35 The parol 
evidence rule, in fact, is a matter of substantive state law, not a rule 
of evidence.36 This point may be particularly noteworthy in tenns 
of what law will apply to the agreement and whether an action is 
filed in state or federal court.37 A federal court sitting in diversity 
jurisdiction will look to the relevant state law to detennine the 
applicability of the parol evidence rule.38 
The parol evidence rule, not surprisingly, has exceptions. If an 
agreement "appears to incompletely express the parties' 
agreement," then the court may pennit the introduction of extrinsic 
evidence.39 An example of this exception is an agreement 
referring to an attached exhibit A that never, in fact, was attached 
to the agreement.40 The court may pennit parol evidence to 
establish what exhibit A was supposed to be. If the court finds the 
agreement ambiguous, then extrinsic evidence may be allowed to 
resolve any ambiguity.41 
An additional benefit of the integration clause is that it carries 
great wei§ht that the final agreement is exactly what the parties 
intended.4 The inclusion of an integration clause reduces the 
chances that the court will find the agreement ambiguous. 
Whether an integration clause will be considered sufficient to 
bar a later claim for fraudulent inducement may depend on whether 
the language in the integration clause is broad enough to cover the 
representations fonning the basis for the fraud claim.43 The 
language quoted above is the type of language found sufficient to 
bar a releasor's claim of fraudulent inducement. Indeed, this 
language expressly disclaims the existence of any representations 
upon which plaintiff could rely and further suggests that any 
alleged reliance on such representations would be unfounded. 
35. Posey v. Ford Motor Credit Co., III P.3d 162, 165 (Idaho Ct. App. 2005). 
36. Am. Econ. Ins. Co. v. Bogdahn, 89 P.3d 1051, 1060 & n.15 (Okla. 2004), aff'd, 
No. 02-6172, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 3699 (10th Cir. Feb. 26, 2004). 
37. See, e.g., Patton v. Mid-Continent Sys., Inc., 841 F.2d 742, 749-50 (7th Cir. 
1988) (case brought in federal court but state law applied). 
38. See Vigortone, 316 F.3d at 642-44 (looking to Illinois law). 
39. See Wolt v. Sherwood, 828 F. Supp. 1562, 1565-66 (D. Utah 1993) (quoting 
Palmer v. Davis, 808 P.2d 128, 132 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (stating that the release 
did "not contain an integration clause to indicate that its [sic] sets forth all of the 
terms of the settlement"». 
40. Old First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Scheuman, 13 N.E.2d 551, 558-59 (Ind. 
1938). 
41. Walt, 828 F. Supp. at 1565 (quoting Palmer, 808 P.2d at 132). 
42. Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63,75 n.6 (1977). 
43. Cf Mfrs. Hanover Trust Co. v. Yanakas, 7 F.3d 310, 316 (2d Cir. 1993) (finding 
support for the proposition that "the mere general recitation that a guarantee is 
'absolute and unconditional' is insufficient ... to bar a defense of fraudulent 
inducement"). 
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Thus, the claimant may be unable to prove two of the elements of a 
typical fraud claim: misrepresentation and reasonable reliance. 
Although the parol evidence rule may serve some of the same 
purposes as an integration clause, they are not redundant. Given 
the exceptions to the parol evidence rule, the strong desire to avoid 
relitigation of settled issues, and the inability to anticipate all 
possible future court actions, all possible future forums, and all 
possible future legal theories, including an integration clause and a 
favorable choice of law provision will increase the chances of 
prevailing in or averting any subsequent challenge to the validity 
of the settlement agreement and release. 
6. Ownership of Claims and the Financial Instrument 
A well-drafted settlement agreement should include a provision 
confirming the claimant's ownership of the claims alleged and 
released in the settlement agreement. In the context of forward-
looking financial instruments, however, the settlement agreement 
should go one step further and include a representation and 
warranty that the releasing party is the owner of the pertinent 
financial instrument. The careful practitioner should also take care 
to confirm that the releasing party is, in fact, what he or she 
purports to be-the owner of the relevant financial instrument. If 
more than one owner is identified, or if more than one person may 
have an ownership interest, for example co-trustees, then all 
potential parties must verify ownership and sign the settlement 
agreement and release. Although a trustee may be authorized to 
sign the settlement agreement, from a practical perspective a 
financial services company is not interested in litigating this issue 
and should not be exposed to this risk. The better practice is to 
ensure that the proper parties all sign and verify ownership of both 
the claims and the financial instrument. 
7. The Importance of Surrender, Return, Cancellation, and 
Relinquishment of All Rights Under the Financial Instrument 
Regardless of whether the financial instrument is a life 
insurance policy, annuity, stock, investment account, or some other 
vehicle, it is critical that the financial services company obtain the 
benefits of its bargain. If this means the insurance policy, annuity, 
or stock owned by the releasing party is to have no further value, 
then the prudent practitioner should insist on provisions in the 
settlement agreement and release (1) obligating the releasing party 
to surrender the original policy, annuity, stock certificate, or other 
like documents; and (2) confirming that the policy, annuity, stock, 
or other like documents are canceled; all rights and obligations 
incident thereto are void and of no further force and effect; and all 
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rights, duties, and obligations are extinguished as of the date of the 
settlement agreement and release. 
The settlement agreement should specifically provide that the 
parties agree the releasing party shall have no right to receive any 
past, present, or future rights or benefits of any kind or nature 
under the specific instrument. Conversely, the settlement 
agreement should provide that the financial services company has 
no further obligations of any kind or nature, either past, present, or 
future, under the financial instrument. 
If the financial instrument could be returned to the company, 
then the prudent practitioner should require the formal surrender of 
the original and all copies of the policy, annuity, or bond. If the 
financial instrument could be returned to the company but the 
claimant is unable to locate it, then the prudent practitioner should 
consider asking for a representation and warranty that the 
document cannot be located and, if it is located, will be destroyed 
immediately and cannot be returned to the financial services 
company for any reason. A related provision stating that the 
policy, annuity, or bond is canceled and of no further force, effect, 
or value of any kind or nature, even if located in the future, should 
also be included. 
The language outlined above, in conjunction with a broad 
release, should avoid situations where the releasing party claims 
the right to receive cash value in a whole life policy, death 
benefits, disability benefits, or future annuity payments. Indeed, 
even if the releasing party is unquestionably trustworthy, his or her 
descendants may not be; this provision will help guard against such 
prospective claims. 
8. Confidentiality Clause -Its Necessity and Extent of Inclusion 
Although most financial services companies prefer settlement 
agreements to include confidentiality clauses, this is an 
increasingly contentious issue. From the financial services 
company's perspective, the benefits are obvious. The financial 
services company wants to avoid adverse publicity, which may 
tarnish the reputation of the company and precipitate additional 
claims. Although some releasing parties may not wish to keep a 
settlement agreement confidential, if the releasing party makes 
clear from the beginning that confidentiality is a part of the 
agreement, then obtaining this type of provision is often easier than 
it would be if the issue is not broached until late in the drafting 
process. 
Two related points about confidentiality are worth mentioning. 
As a threshold matter, consider including a statement in the 
settlement agreement that both parties agree is not a violation of 
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the confidentiality agreement. The parties could agree that they 
may disclose only the following: "Plaintiff and ABC Worldwide 
Financial Services agree to resolve this matter upon mutually 
acceptable terms without either admitting liability." 
If a confidentiality provision permits disclosure in response to a 
court order or for good cause, then this may expose the 
confidential settlement agreement to discovery in subsequent 
actions involving different parties.44 Although the majority view is 
that courts should encourage settlements by employing a 
heightened standard of review before ordering production of a 
confidential settlement agreement,45 other courts have found no 
additional scrutiny is necessary or appropriate.46 
A secondary consideration is whether to seek to impose 
stipulated consequences for a breach of the confidentiality 
provision. A provision stipulating to liquidated damages equal to 
fifty percent of the settlement amount if plaintiff breaches the 
confidentiality provision may be particularly appropriate if 
confidentiality is a critical component of the settlement agreement. 
If a liquidated damages provision is included, then care should be 
given to setting the right amount. In Maryland, for example, 
liquidated damages cannot be penal and must fairly approximate 
the damages likely to be suffered by the non-breaching party.47 
Moreover, it should be noted that, if the court orders disclosure of 
the confidential terms of a settlement agreement, then the court 
may not enforce the liquidated damages provision in the 
confidential settlement agreement.48 
The question of the effectiveness of the confidentiality clause 
also may tum on such mundane variables as whether the second 
action seeking the discovery is pending in federal or state court. In 
a federal court action in Florida, the court denied a sex 
discrimination plaintiffs request to discover confidential 
settlement agreements in other sex discrimination cases against the 
employer absent a showing that the information was relevant.49 
Contrast this with a state court action in Florida, where plaintiffs 
sought to depose a plaintiff from an earlier case that had resulted in 
a settlement agreement including a confidentiality clause 
44. Brant v. CCG Fin. Corp., No. 87-655, 1989 U.S. Dis!. LEXIS 15269, at *4, 8-9 
(D. Or. Dec. 14, 1989). 
45. Young v. State Fann Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 169 F.R.D. 72, 79 (S.D. W. Va. 1996). 
46. Griffin v. Mashariki, No. 96-6400, 1997 U.S. Dis!. LEXIS 19325, at *3 
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 8, 1997). 
47. United Cable Television of Balt. Ltd. P'ship v. Burch, 354 Md. 658, 668, 732 
A.2d 887, 892 (1999). 
48. Kalinauskas v. Wong, 151 F.R.D. 363, 367 (D. Nev. 1993). 
49. Walker v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 286 F.3d 1270, 1280 (11th Cir. 
2002). 
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prohibiting responding '''in any way to any inquiry of any kind 
whatsoever with regard to the facts surrounding the case/claim. ,,,50 
The common defendant sought a protective order to prevent the 
deposition from taking place.51 The trial court ordered that the 
earlier plaintiff could testify to "factual matters concerning the 
allegations" in the earlier lawsuit but not to procedural aspects.52 
On appeal, the order was affirmed based on (1) the trial court's 
broad discretion in handling discovery; (2) the public policy 
considerations encouraging settlements are less important than the 
suppression of evidence; and (3) the relevance of the evidence 
sought. 53 Contrast this with a case where the settlement agreement 
contained a strict confidentiality clause that had no excegtion for 
disclosure pursuant to a court order or judicial process. 4 The 
court upheld the magistrate judge's decision to grant a full 
protective order precluding disclosure of the facts and 
circumstances surrounding the settlement agreement. 55 
The Georgia Court of Appeals has taken yet another position, 
holding that there is an implied term in any confidentiality clause 
in a settlement agreement that a party can "testify or otherwise 
comply with a subpoena, court order, or applicable law.,,56 Tn 
Barger v. Garden Way, Inc., the plaintiff injured his hand in a 
wood chipper and sued the manufacturer. 57 He sought details of 
other persons injured by the same product and disclosure of any 
relevant information purportedly subject to confidentiality 
agreements. 58 The defendant opposed this request, contending the 
trial court had no authority to make the defendant surrender freely 
bargained-for rights.59 The trial court accepted this position, but 
was subsequently overturned and defendant was required to answer 
the discovery.6o Significantly, however, the precise language of 
the relevant confidentiality clause was never provided to the 
court.61 
These cases demonstrate the need for careful consideration of 
the language to be included in a confidentiality clause. Although 
there is no "one size fits all" solution, careful consideration of the 
50. Scott v. Nelson, 697 So. 2d 1300, 1300 (Fla. Dis!. Ct. App. 1997). 
51. Id. 
52. Id. 
53. Id. at 1301. 
54. Hasbrouck v. BankAmerica Hous. Servs., Inc., 190 F.R.D. 42, 43 (N.D.N.Y. 
1999). 
55. Id. at 44-45. 
56. Barger v. Garden Way, Inc., 499 S.E.2d 737,741 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998). 
57. Id. at 739-40. 
58. Id. at 740. 
59. Id. 
60. Id. at 740-41. 
61. Id. at 740. 
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benefits and burdens of various confidentiality provIsIons is 
appropriate and the provisions should be tailored to the needs of 
the specific financial services company. 
9. Deny Liability 
By including a paragraph specifically denying liability for the 
claims asserted and stating that the settlement agreement is 
intended to resolve disputed claims, the party paying the 
consideration is accomplishing two goals. First, the paying party is 
not conceding the existence of grounds for imposing liability, 
which could have important consequences in terms of reporting 
obligations-accounting, securities, Sarbanes-Oxley, or otherwise. 
Although the compromise of a disputed claim may be reportable 
under certain circumstances, the disclosure of the compromise of a 
disputed claim rarely rises to the level of a significant corporate 
event with prospective and adverse consequences. Second, the 
paying party is laying the foundation for the argument to exclude 
the settlement agreement in any future cases. Although a 
confidential settlement agreement may be discoverable in 
subsequent litigation,62 it may not be admissible at trial because it 
is only evidence that the parties compromised a disputed claim 
and, therefore, may not be relevant in future actions.63 
10. Choice of Law and Choice of Forum - Important Decisions 
with Important Impact 
Forum selection and choice of law provisions are presumptively 
valid.64 Although choices of law and forum generally are 
considered on a state-by-state basis, if the underlying claims are 
predicated on federal law, then careful consideration should be 
given to whether state law will apply under any circumstance.65 
In order to ensure that courts give effect to the parties' choice of 
forum, consider including mandatory terms such as '"exclusive,''' 
62. Doe v. Mcthacton Sch. Dist., 164 FRD. 175, 176 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (recognizing 
that relevant settlement agreements are discoverable); Poner Hayden Co. v. 
Bullinger, 350 Md. 452, 466,713 A.2d 962, 969 (1998) ("[T]he relevant portions 
of ... settlement agreements are discoverable."). 
63. E.g., FED. R. EVID. 408. 
64. MIS Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. I, 9 (1972); Tjontveit v. Den 
Norske Bank ASA, 997 F. Supp. 799, 805 (S.D. Tex. 1998). 
65. See Maynard v. Durham & S. Ry. Co., 365 U.S. 160 (1961) (quoting Dice v. 
Akron, 342 U.S. 359, 361 (1952) (stating that the validity of a release under the 
Federal Employers' Liability Act presents a question of federal law, not state 
law)). 
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"'sole,''' and "'only.",66 A relatively typical forum selection and 
choice of law provision might be the following: 
Governing Law. This Agreement shall be 
governed by and construed in accordance with the 
laws of the State of without regard to 
Choice of Law principles. This Agreement shall be 
enforced only in a court of competent jurisdiction 
and venue within the State of ------
The obvious advantage to this clause is convenience, assuming 
forum is something the parties are willing to agree on. If a party 
negotiating from a dominant position imposes an unreasonable 
forum, then the choice of law clause may not be given effect where 
the chosen state has no reasonable relation to the parties or the 
nature of the agreement. 67 This is not to suggest, however, that it 
would be inappropriate to consider how a particular state law 
might construe or enforce the settlement agreement. 
Although the presumptive validity of a choice of law or choice 
of forum provision can be rebutted, the burden is on the party 
challenging that provision.68 Moreover, the party challenging the 
provision has the burden of showing the clause is unreasonable 
because (1) the provision was induced by "fraud or overreaching;" 
(2) the selected forum will result in "grave inconvenience or 
unfairness;" (3) the choice of law is fundamentally unfair; or (4) 
enforcement contravenes "a strong public policy of the forum 
state.,,69 
11. Waiver of Jury Trial- The Benefit and the Burden 
Although most financial services companies might prefer to 
have a dispute concerning the validity of any settlement agreement 
determined by the court as opposed to a jury, the careful 
practitioner should take note of the legal issues inherent in 
including a waiver of jury trial provision in a settlement 
agreement. In Maryland, for example, it seems settled that "parties 
can contractually waive their right to a jury trial.,,70 Pennsylvania 
66. Cable Tel Servs., Inc. v. Overland Contracting, Inc., 574 S.E.2d 31,34-35 (N.C. 
App. 2002) (quoting Mark Group Int'l, Inc. v. Still, 566 S.E.2d 160, 162 (N.C. 
App. 2002». 
67. Robinson v. Robinson, 778 So. 2d 1I05, 1117-18 (La. 2001) (finding North 
Carolina choice of law provision in settlement agreement against public policy 
because one party would unfairly benefit and no significant connection was 
present); Lang Tendons, Inc. v. Great Sw. Mktg. Co., No. 90-7847, 1994 WL 
159014, at '"4 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 25, 1994). 
68. Weiss v. La Suisse, Societe D'Assurances Sur La Vie, 154 F. Supp. 2d 734, 736 
(S.D.N.Y.2001). 
69. Haynsworth v. Corp., 121 F.3d 956, 963 (5th Cir. 1997). 
70. Walther v. Sovereign Bank, 386 Md. 412,442, 872 A.2d 735, 753 (2005). See 
also ST Sys. Corp. v. Md. Nat'l Bank, 112 Md. App. 20, 33-35, 684 A.2d 32, 38-
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courts likewise enforce prelitigation waivers of the right to a jury 
trial. 71 
In Grafton Partners L.P. v. Superior Court,72 the California 
Supreme Court held that prelitigation jury trial waiver agreements 
are unenforceable.73 The Georgia Supreme Court reached the 
same conclusion eleven years earlier in Bank South, NA. v. 
Howard. 74 
If the decision is made to include a provision waiving jury trial, 
then consider including the provision in all capital letters in order 
to avoid any claim that it was inconspicuous and was slipped by 
both claimant and counsel. Another reason to employ capital 
letters is the possibility of a reviewing court's determination that 
the releasor was giving up a fundamental constitutional right.75 
Including this provision in all capitals runs the risk that claimant's 
counsel may object to its inclusion, but if the provision is included 
after an objection is made, then the provision unquestionably was 
accepted by the claimant as part of the compromise necessary to 
achieve a settlement. Although this would not overcome any 
constitutional deficiency found by a reviewing court, it should 
weigh heavily in favor of the released parties in any other context. 
An example of language that might be appropriate for inclusion 
in a settlement agreement seeking a waiver of the right to jury trial 
is as follows: 
Waiver ofJury Trial. ALL PARTIES TO 
THIS AGREEMENT HEREBY WAIVE TRIAL 
BY JURY IN ANY ACTION, PROCEEDING, 
SUIT, COUNTERCLAIM, CROSS-CLAIM, OR 
THIRD-PARTY CLAIM BROUGHT BY ANY OF 
THE PARTIES HERETO ON ANY MATTERS 
WHATSOEVER ARISING OUT OF OR IN ANY 
WAY RELATED TO OR CONNECTED WITH 
THIS AGREEMENT. 
40 ( 1996) (waiving trial by jury for "transactions contemplated" before any 
dispute or litigation arises). 
71. Eighth N.-Val, Inc. v. Parkinson, 773 A.2d 1248, 1256 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2001); 
Acad. Indus., Inc. v. PNC Bank, N.A., 54 Pa. D. & C.4th 424, 427-28 (2001); 
Mesne Props., Inc. v. Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co., 2001 PhiIa. Ct. Com. PI. LEXIS 
105, at * 14-17 (April 6, 2001). 
72. 116 P.3d 479 (Cal. 2005). 
73. Id. at 482-88. 
74. 444 S.E.2d 799, 800 (Ga. 1994). 
75. See U.S. CONST. amend. VII (preserving inviolate the common law right to a jury 
trial for legal claims). 
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Putting aside the constitutional ~uestion, this provision is 
construed under basic contract law,7 and parties to a contract 
generally are entitled to waive their right to a jury trial.77 So long 
as "there is clear, unambiguous waiver to a jury trial," the waiver 
should be enforceable.78 
A careful practitioner including a waiver of jury trial provision 
almost without exception should include a severability provision in 
the settlement agreement. The reason to do so is to avoid giving a 
claimant grounds to attack the entire settlement agreement based 
on the alleged constitutional invalidity of one provision-waiver of 
jury trial. Indeed, even if this one provision is determined to be 
invalid, it seems likely that in most cases the paying party will 
continue to desire judicial enforcement of the remaining settlement 
terms. 
12. Severability - Generally a Necessary Provision 
"Whether a contract is entire or severable generally is a 
question of intention, to be determined from the language 
employed by the parties, viewed in the light of the circumstances 
surrounding them at the time they contracted.,,79 By explicitly 
stating the provisions in the settlement agreement are severable, 
the financial services company has created evidence of the parties' 
intentions. Indeed, a typical severability clause provides: 
Severability. If any portion or portions of this 
Agreement are held by a court of competent 
jurisdiction to conflict with any federal, state, or 
local law, and as a result such portion or portions 
are declared to be invalid and of no force or effect 
in such jurisdiction, all remaining portions of this 
Agreement shall otherwise remain in full force and 
effect and be construed as if such invalid portion or 
portions had not been included herein. 
76. E.g., Cantor Fitzgerald, Inc. v. Cantor Fitzgerald, L.P., No. 00C-05-15I WCC, 
2001 WL 589028, at *2 (Del. Super. Ct. May 24, 2001). 
77. Seaford Assocs. v. Hess Apparel, Inc., No. 92C-IO-II, 1993 WL 258723, at *2 
(Del. Super. Ct. June 22, 1993). See also Fleet Nat'l Bank v. Hartstone, No. 96-
10 I 66-NG, 1997 WL 557564, at *14 (D. Mass. May 29, 1997) (striking julY 
demand by a party to a settlement agreement containing an express waiver of the 
right to a julY trial). 
78. See Seaford Assocs., 1993 WL 258723, at *2 (describing valid julY trial waiver). 
Cj Bonnie-Lassie Sportswear, Inc. v. CentuIY Factors, Inc., 127 N. Y.S.2d 740, 
741 (N.Y. App. Div. 1954); Browning v. Holloway, 620 S.W.2d 611, 618 (Tex. 
Civ. App. 1981) (rejecting defendant's argument that language in settlement 
agreement gave court fact-finding power and was therefore a waiver of right to 
jury trial). 
79. Christian v. Christian, 365 N.E.2d 849, 856 (N.Y. 1977) (citation omitted); 
Barden & Robeson Corp. v. Timmerman, 497 N.Y.S.2d 196, 197 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 1986) (citation omitted). 
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The District Court of Appeal of Florida found error in a lower 
tribunal's decision not to apply the severability clause and set aside 
the entire settlement agreement. 80 The appeals court found the 
severability clause to be sufficiently broad that the solitary invalid 
term could be struck, leaving the rest of the agreement effective.8l 
There are instances, however, when an entire agreement will be 
deemed invalid despite a severability clause.82 If the questionable 
term is at the heart of the agreement, and striking that term would 
render the rest of the areement mere "rhetoric," then the entire 
agreement may be void.8 
Although the purpose of this clause is largely self-explanatory, 
for some of the reasons discussed above with respect to waiver of 
jury trial, the provision may become important for unanticipated 
and prospective reasons. If, for example, a court holds that a 
certain provision in a settlement agreement is contrary to a 
particular state's public policy, then the paying party may prefer to 
have the offending provision declared invalid without voiding the 
entire settlement agreement. 
13. Tax Consequences Provision Is Absolutely Essential 
An issue that frequently arises during settlement negotiations is 
the tax consequences of the payment being made as part of the 
settlement. The claimant, of course, wants as much of the recovery 
as possible to be non-taxable income. The paying party generally 
is interested only in making clear that it has no responsibility for 
reporting in a particular manner or paying any taxes due. An 
example of such a clause is as follows: 
Tax Consequences. The undersigned parties 
acknowledge that no party to this Agreement has 
made representations concerning, nor shall any 
party be responsible in any manner for, any income 
tax consequences to any other party arising out of 
this Agreement and/or the above-mentioned 
consideration. Any tax liability of Releasor to any 
federal, state, or local taxing authority shall be 
Releasor's exclusive responsibility. Releasor agrees 
to make no claim against the Releasing Party 
regarding the reporting, if any, to taxing authorities 
of any payment made pursuant to this Agreement or 
for the payment or reimbursement of any tax 
80. Brevard County Bd. Of Comm'rs v. Williams, 715 So. 2d 1100, 1102 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 1998). 
81. Id. 
82. In re U.S. Brass Corp., 277 B.R. 326, 329-30 (E.D. Tex. 2002). 
83. !d. at 33\-32. 
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consequences resulting to Releasor as a result of 
any payment made pursuant to this Agreement. 
365 
This is not to say that settlement agreements are written without 
consideration of the tax implications. Indeed, certain contract and 
tort personal injury damages and consequential damages arising 
from these claims may be excludable from income for tax 
purposes.84 In determining whether the income is excludable, 
generally speaking, the "express language in a settlement 
agreement is the most important factor," but a court is not "bound 
by express allocations in a written settlement agreement if the 
parties did not engage in bona fide, arm's-length adversarial 
negotiations.,,85 This is particularly true when the correct 
allocation can be determined from other evidence, which reveals 
that the payment represented something other than that stated in 
the agreement. 86 
If the financial services company is asked to consider allocating 
payment in a manner intended to receive favorable tax treatment 
for the plaintiff, then the financial services company might 
consider asking for similar favorable terms. If plaintiff wants to 
allocate the settlement amount to a particular claim in order to seek 
favorable tax treatment, then the financial services company 
should consider asking plaintiff to acknowledge that any and all 
other claims, for which settlement payment might be considered 
for tax purposes, have no merit, or at the very least are factually 
and legally deficient. Even if the financial services company 
agrees to some sort of allocation language in the settlement 
agreement, however, it still should insist on a provision providing 
that no tax consequence is assured or in any way relevant to the 
validity of the settlement agreement. 
14. Further Assurances Provision Is Often Worth Including 
A further assurances provision can be particularly appropriate in 
the context of financial instruments. Either party may need the 
assistance of the other in connection with tax or record-keeping 
issues. For this reason, and to avoid unreasonable and 
84. 26 U.S.C.A. § 104(a)(2) (West 2002); see also Lane v. United States, 902 F. 
Supp. 1439, 1443 (W.O. Okla. 1995) (acknowledging certain insurance "contract 
damages are excludable from income"). But see Comm'r v. Schleier, SIS U.S. 
323, 327 (1995) (finding that amounts received in settlement for Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act claim did not fall within exclusion from gross 
income as damages received on account of personal injuries or sickness). "When 
the settlement agreement allocates clearly the settlement proceeds, . . . the 
allocation is generally binding for tax purposes .... " Robinson v. Comm'r, 102 
T.C. 116, 127 (1994), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 70 F.3d 34,39 (5th Cir. 1995). 
85. McKay v. Comm'r, 102 T.C. 465, 482 (1994), vacated, 84 F.3d 433 (5th Cir. 
1996). 
86. Millenbach v. Comm'r, 318 F.3d 924, 933-34 (9th Cir. 2003). 
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unprincipled refusals to cooperate absent a payment in tribute, 
consider including a further assurance provision, such as: 
Further Assurances. The parties agree to execute 
such further and additional documents, instruments, 
and writings as may be necessary, proper, required, 
desirable, or convenient for the purpose of fully 
effectuating the terms and provisions of this 
Agreement. 
15. Consider Inclusion of Provision Regarding Attorneys' Fees 
Including a provision for the payment of attorneys' fees in the 
event of a breach of a settlement agreement can be a contentious 
issue, particularly if the provision is unilateral. For this reason, if 
such a provision is desired, it makes sense to propose a mutual 
provision, meaning either party could recover attorneys' fees if 
there is a breach of the agreement. From the perspective of the 
payor party, such a provision often is viewed favorably because it 
helps to discourage frivolous challenges to the validity of the 
settlement agreement. 
CONCLUSION 
This article is not intended to anticipate every possible adverse 
consequence arising from settlement agreements, or to suggest that 
all future litigation concerning settlement agreements is avoidable. 
Rather, the point is that careful negotiation and drafting should 
avoid many future disputes and should keep most matters forever 
resolved. From a transactional viewpoint, it is cost effective to 
negotiate a carefully crafted and definitive settlement agreement. 
Even if only one lawsuit is avoided or summarily dismissed, then 
the settlement agreement's effectiveness is affirmed. In addition, 
by consistently employing a thorough and complete agreement, the 
vast majority of agreements will go unchallenged. Mounting a 
collateral attack on a carefully crafted and definitive settlement 
agreement is difficult and will impose high barriers to any potential 
challenger. In the small fraction of cases where a challenge is 
made, the court likely will be in a position to summarily dispose of 
the matter without permitting discovery or admitting any extrinsic 
evidence. 
